Paper presented at 16th world Congress of International Political Science Association,

held in Berlin, Germany, August 22-25, 1994

 


Kim Young Sam Regime and the Labor

Movement



by

Under the previous military regimes, state became a blatant instrument for capital accumulation and a vehicle of "primacy of export" policy based on long working hours and low wages. The labor policy of the state of the military regime could be described as an "oppressive exclusionary strategy based on barrack-state and paternalistic control." During this period, the military regime had attempted to restrict the workers' right to organize, and transformed the Federation of Korea Trade Unions-- which is the official national organization of the trade union movement-- into a labor management agency of the state. Through these efforts, the military regime hoped to prevent the growth of the

spontaneous economic struggles of the workers and their efforts to build trade unions. However, as a result of the June Democratic Struggle in 1987 and the subsequent Workers Struggles in July and August of the same year, it became impossible for the newly inaugurated Roh Tae Woo regime to repeat and continue the labor policies of the previous military regimes. In October 1987, various labor-related laws were revised. Although the amended laws kept intact a number of clauses which limit labor rights, they recognized in principle the rights and freedom to organize trade unions and to strike. They also adopted consolidated criteria for labor conditions through the establishment of such instruments as minimum wage system. These change signalled a departure from the "barrack-state paternalistic control" which undergirded the labor policies of the Korean state since the military coup d'etat in 1961. For the first time the state recognized the legality of the trade unions at the company level and adopted "legalistic-economistic control strategy" as the guiding principle of the labor policies aiming to cultivate de-politicized corporatistic trade union movement. The "legalistic-econornistic control strategy" is the guiding principle and the main characteristic, not only of the Roh Tae Woo regime that came into power in February 1988, but also the Kim Young Sam regime which emerged in February 1992 as the first civilian government since the military coup d'etat in May 1961.

Following the Workers Struggle in 1987, organization of trade unions expanded at an accelerated speed. Together with the union organizing efforts, a new form of labor movement emerged to resist the legalistic-economistic control strategy of the state. The new form of labor movement brought about in January 1990, the formation of the Council of Korea Trade Unions (known in Korean as Jeunnohyup), representing the democratic trade union movement as opposed to the "yellow trade unionism" of the Federation of Korea Trade Unions. The new democratic trade union movement maintains a position of independence from the state and capital, militancy on issues of basic rights and emphasize the importance of joint and solidarity struggles. It also endeavors to organize workers' struggles on political demands. The new labor movement is also characterized by its efforts to build the working class into a political force.

This paper attempts, on the basis of an analysis of the labor policy of the Kim Young Sam regime, to portray the development of the democratic trade union movement and outline its future prospects. In particular, we will attempt to analyze the character of the reforms undertaken by the Kim regime and its effect on the development of the democratic labor movement in south Korea.

II. The State and the Labor Movement Under the Roh Tae Woo Regime

A comprehensive understanding of the present relationship between the state and labor requires some rudimentary understanding of their relationship under the Roh Tae Woo regime. Following is a brief summary of the analysis pertaining to the period of Roh Tae Woo regime.

The Roh Tae Woo regime which came into power following the nation-wide struggles for democracy in June 1987 faced a drastically changed social and political atmosphere in its initial period. Explosion of people's demands for democratization, loss of government majority in the National Assembly, and weakness in its legitimacy conditioned -- and constituted -- the initial "soft policy" period. In this period, the Roh Tae Woo regime reacted to the labor movement which began to gain momentum following the great wave of strike actions in July-August 1987 in a defensive manner. However, in March 1989, the government demonstrated its opposition to further democratization of the labor-capital relations by undertaking presidential veto of the legislative amendments to the various laws on labor relations prepared by the National Assembly. Korean economy began showing signs of depression since late 1988 with the expiration of the "boom" generated by "three lows" (low exchange rate, low oil[resources] price and low interest rate). In reaction to the depression the government attacked workers strikes and wage increase as the primary cause of the economic crisis. And the capital owners and conservative mass media began a campaign calling for wage suppression and forceful measures against labor movement. It was during this period that the Roh Tae Woo government succeeded in navigating through the crisis by bringing the dispute about the "liquidation of the wrongs of the Fifth Republic" to an end through restricted parliamentary investigation. Having brought the crisis of regime to a resolution, Roh regime undertook a series of policy measures such as "public land concept" and Promotion of housing construction aimed at solidifying the integration of the middle classes into the system. Together with such measures to consolidate its power base, it ushered in so-called "security state" through a "special presidential order for law and order." This signalled an active offensive to counter the labor attacks on the capital and secure a capital dominated labor-capital relations. This meant an end to the initial "soft policy" characterized by restraint in state intervention in the industrial disputes. Instead, the government took steps to bring industrial disputes to early end by initiating "law and order" action as soon as "illegal" industrial dispute arose. Thus it waged an active and direct physical crackdown on labor. Furthermore, the Roh Tae Woo regime reversed the political balance by amalgamating three political parties into a mammoth ruling party in May 1990. On the basis of the new momentum, the Roh regime undertook a concerted effort to suppress militant trade union movement and to destroy Jeunnohyup which had emerged as the national center of the democratic trade union movement. The Roh regime re-instituted "wage guideline" which it had abandoned in its early days to suppress wage increase. In 1991, the government announced "comprehensive welfare program for workers" and "6 year plan for reduction of industrial accidents" to alleviate workers complaints while maintaining repressive labor policy. The Roh Tae Woo regime can be described as (except for the "soft policy" in the initial period in power) having maintained a policy of combining a measure of reformistic welfare benefits with essentially brutal repression of the labor movement. The labor policy of the Roh Tae Woo regime can thus be identified as an "oppressive exclusionary policy based on legalistic-economistic control" with a measure of hegemonic integrative policy.

The period from the massive wave of strike action of workers in July-August 1987 to the period culminating with the formation of the Council of Korea Trade Unions (Jeunnohyup) in January 1990 can be described as a period of birth and growth of a new 'democratic trade union movement' based on working class masses. The formation in May 1990 of National Conference of Trade Federations led mainly by white collar workers can also be identified as an important achievement in the growth of the new democratic trade union movement. However, Jeunnohyup which emerged as an organization with a total membership of some 170,000 represented less than 10% of the entire organized workers that numbered some 1.9 million. Furthermore, it was a national level conference of regional level councils of company level trade unions. And its limitation was further accentuated by the fact that the main bulk of the membership came from medium to small sized manufacturing workplaces. The new democratic trade union movement which began to develop an organizational structure through the formation of the Jeunnohyup and the National Conference of Trade Federations was forced into enormous difficulty by the massive campaign of repression in the 'security state.' Great number of activists of the Jeunnohyup were imprisoned, wanted for arrest or dismissed from work under the 'security state'. By the end of 1991, unions affiliation and membership in Jeunnohyup were reduced to almost half the original level. Furthermore, in face of massive repression of the labor movement and effects of other structural factors, the number of strikes initiated, trade union organization and number of organized workers also suffered decrease.

* thousands

** rate of organization (%)

total union membership / total employed workers x 100

data : Ministry of Public Information,

The 6th Republic Public Affairs, 3rd Vol, 1992


Due to government wage freeze policy to keep wage increase below 10% despite the slowing down of economic growth and rises in prices, the rate of wage increase continued to fall since 1989.

* 'nominal wage increase' means the increase in the formal basic wage specified in the collective bargaining agreement between unions and managements.

** 'real wage increase' includes the increases in various allowances, bonuses, incentives and benefits as part of the total wage increase. Data ; Ministry of Labor, Statistics 1994. The improvements in the living condition of workers, achieved through their struggles, began to be cancelled out by the government's wage freeze policy and the repeated high inflation rate and explosive increase in the housing cost. These changes in the general environment form the background to the various proclamations about 'crisis of the labor movement' that began to arise since 1990 in the various circles of the academia and the labor movement itself. These proclamations carried a critique of the 'militant struggle policy' of the 'democratic trade union movement'. They called for a labor movement which is built on the labor's willingness to cooperate with the capital in effort to overcome the economic depression and to improve productivity. However, despite the fact that militant struggles of workers and Jeunnohyup suffered severe difficulties and contraction due to the repression by the Roh Tae Woo regime, many labor movement activists who support 'democratic labor movement' were elected into leadership Positions in large number of unit unions in the last days of the Roh regime. This phenomenon reflected the worsening of living conditions of the workers and the possibility of the re-launching of the democratic labor movement committed to militant economic struggles and independence of the labor in relation to the state and the capital.



III. Kim Young Sam Regime and the Labor Movement

The inauguration of the Kim Young Sam regime in February 1993 represents an epochal development in the history of Korean politics in that it represents the emergence of a 'civilian government' through a relatively fair election for the first time since the military coup d'etat in May 1961. The governance by the Kim Young Sam regime since its inauguration to the present can be divided into two phases.

1. The First Phase ' Drastic Reform Measures

Kim Young Sam regime initiated rapid and daring state reforms in the early period of its governance. They include disclosure of private assets of the public officeholders, expulsion of corrupt officials, enactment of a law on officeholders' ethics, removal of high ranking military personnel identified with the past regimes, reduction in the size and role of the Agency for National Security Planning and the Defense Intelligence Command, and the introduction of a 'real name banking account system'. These reform measures brought about an intensification of conflict within the ruling bloc between the pro-Kim Young Sam forces and the clique which had grew out of the past regimes. The reforms also brought about a souring of relations between the regime and the monopoly chaebol that make up the core of Korean capital. During this period of reforms, the labor policy of the state also underwent some degree of change. This took the form of restraint in active state intervention in industrial disputes, proclamation of the principle of autonomy in the labor-management relations, reinstatement of dismissed workers, announcement of willingness to revise various labor related laws which prohibit

multiple unions, third party intervention and other clauses which have severely restricted the workers right to association.

However, the reform measures of the Kim Young Sam regime were not aimed at a comprehensive reform but a limited reform. The reform measures were aimed at removing corrupt officials and political enemies and the broadening the realm of civil society for the middle classes as a means for reorganizing the ruling bloc. They stopped short of repealing the National Security Law and other similar laws which were fundamental elements in the legal system that sustained the military system.

Kim Young Sam regime also gave top priority to short term and long term economic policy aimed at reactivation of the economy. Short term economic policy took the form of '100 days plan for new economy', a typical economic pump-primming measure. And the long term economic policy took the form of '5 year plan for new economy' which called for -- among other aims -- business specialization. Kim Young Sam regime called on the monopoly chaebol to participate actively in the government plans aimed at activating the economy. In doing so, it provided greater freedom for business activities and other benefits.

On the other hand, Kim Young Sam regime called on the workers to take part in 'burden sharing'. It also announced its goal to clamp down on inflation below 3% level. (This pledge was not fulfilled as inflation in 1993 reached 5.8%) This was a part of its call on the workers to restrain from industrial dispute. As a specific measure, the government issued a wage guideline to keep wage increases in public enterprises below 3% level. It nudged the Korea Federation of Industrial Organizations (business 'peak' organization) and the Federation of Korea Trade Unions to support government wage freeze policy to produce an agreement to keep wage increase in 1993 below 5% level. Government praised this agreement as an autonomous social settlement between labor and capital and called for the loyalty of all workers and business.

The principle of autonomy in the labor-management relations proclaimed by the Kim regime upon inauguration was welcomed by the labor which had been severely victimized by the oppressive state intervention under the past regimes. Workers' expectation rose in response to the pledge by the Kim regime to continue with reforms and to revise or repeal repressive elements in the labor related laws. Hi~h expectation was followed by calls within the democratic trade union movement to restrain from industrial disputes to give support to the Kim regime's reform drive. However, workers' living conditions have worsened under the Roh Tae Woo regime, and officially announced inflation rate -- not to mention real household inflation -- had already reached 6.2%. In such an environment government's wage freeze policy was seen by many workers who took part in the democratic trade union movement as aiming to step up exploitation of workers in order to achieve economic activation on the basis of the sacrifice of workers. Furthermore, the action of the Federation of Korea Trade Unions in reaching an agreement on wage increase ceiling was seen as an obstacle for struggles of unit unions for wage increase. In response to such a betrayal by the FKTU, many

unions began a campaign to boycott affiliation dues to the Federation.

The struggle of workers to renew collective bargaining agreement on wage increase in 1993 took place in two detrimental conditions. One was set in place by increased public support for the Kim regime's reform drive and effective ideological campaign of the government and conservative mass media against the workers' industrial action. The other condition was shaped by confusion within the labor movement itself over the appropriate struggle policy. In such an environment -- constrained also by 4.7% increase in the 1992 GNP growth, the lowest since the mid-1980s -- average nominal wage increase reached only 5.2%, the lowest since 1988. However, the real wage increase in 1993 averaged 12.2%. This indicates that workers were able to achieve wage increase above the ceiling set by the agreement between the National Federation of Industrial Organizations and the Federation of Korea Trade Unions despite the disadvantageous conditions. The struggle of Hyundai workers in Ulsan reached a new level of intensification following the attempt by the management to 'buy-off' the chairperson of Hyundai Precision Industry Trade Union. In response to the drawn out stalemate between the management and the labor in Hyundai companies, government abandoned its principle of non-intervention in the industrial disputes and mobilized the law and order agencies to coercively bring the industrial dispute to an end. (This took place following a meeting between the president and a number of chaebol leaders in the Presidential Palace on July 2.)

The government utilized the prohibition of third party intervention -- which it had pledged to repeal -- as an instrument to imprison a large number of trade union leaders. The government postponed the work on the revision of the various problematic clauses in the labor related laws and dismissed the Labor Minister Lee In Jae who had maintained a soft line policy on labor. The government also overturned the principle of 'no work, partial wage' proposed by Labor Minister Lee In Jae and returned to the position of "no work, no wage". It also renegaded from the promise to reinstate workers who had been dismissed in the course of industrial disputes. The chain of government actions signalled a reversion in government's labor policy to a repressive position. It also forced a change in the attitude of the democratic trade union movement which had built up expectation in the Kim regime's reform drive.

On June 1, 1993, midst ongoing wage increase struggles, the major organizations of the democratic trade union movement -- Council of Korea Trade Unions (Jeunnohyup), National Conference of Trade Federations (Trade Federations), General Federation of Hyundai Company Trade Unions (Hyundai General Federation), Council of Large Companies Trade Unions (Large Unions Council) -- which had opposed the position of the Federation of Korea Trade Unions launched National Conference of Trade Union Representatives (National Union Conference, or Jeunnodae in Korean acronym). Jeunnodae brought together some 1,145 trade unions and nearly 400,000 unionist throughout the country. Although Jeunnodae is only a forum of the office holders of trade unions, it represent a significant step towards consolidating the national unity of the democratic trade union movement by bringing together the dispersed elements and forces of the movement.

2. The Second Phase: Tailing Out of the Reform Drive

In the first phase of its governance, the Kim Young Sam regime began with a reform drive and efforts to reinvigorate the economy. However, midway through the first phase, reform drive became subordinated to the efforts to revitalize the economy. The beginning of the second phase of Kim Young Sam regime's governance can be traced to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1993. In this phase, the reform drive came to a halt and the linkage between the Kim regime and the chaebol and the former ruling clique entered a new level of consolidation. The Kim Young Sam regime concluded the Uruguay Round negotiations by giving final approval to the liberalization of rice market despite intense opposition from the farmers. It also proclaimed "consolidation of national competitiveness" as the utmost government objective in response to the globalization trends. It called for national unity as the fundamental task in order to survive in the era of full-fledged competition in the international society. It identified the large capital as the main agent of national competitiveness and initiated various deregulation and support measures for their operation.

The Kim Young Sam regime prepared for the new environment by actively seeking a reconciliation and cooperation with the former ruling clique of the Fifth and the Sixth Republic. This overall turnabout in the policy direction brought about a strengthening of the voice of monopoly capital towards the government. This signalled a de facto shelving of the "5 year plan for new economy". Furthermore, as a result of the improvement in the relationship between the power base of the Kim Young Sam regime and the ruling clique of the previous regimes, which had in the past been in conflict, the voice of the conservative former ruling clique also became stronger.

The government also called on the working class to participate in the efforts to improve national competitiveness. The government was determined to suppress wage increase in order to sustain growth of the Korean economy which began in 1993 to show signs of breaking out of depression. It set a ceiling of 3% wage increase for public enterprise workers for 1994 and 5 to 8.9% increase -- a ceiling set up in the agreement between the National Federation of Industrial Organizations and the Federation of Korea Trade Unions -- for private enterprise workers.

During this phase, amended election laws and laws governing political parties -- which had been under discussion for considerable period -- were finally enacted in the 1994 Spring session of the National Assembly. This meant that political reform program of the Kim Young Sam regime would come to a completion with the enactment of as yet pending amendment of laws related to the operation of the National Assembly. The reform of the laws concerning political activities is aimed at establishing a basis for fair election but falls short of providing an institutional arrangement for the political development of the working class and other people's forces.

The government policy of rice market liberalization has critically exacerbated the relationship between farmers and the Kim Young Sam regime. Currently farmers and the government are sharply opposed over the National Assembly ratification of the Uruguay Round agreement. While farmers are demanding a re-negotiation of the Uruguay Round agreement, the government is intent of going ahead with ratification. Government has proposed a program to respond effective to the liberalization of agricultural market. However, the government's new agricultural policy" is a plan for allowing capital to dominate agriculture and agricultural economy and giving "incentives" for small farmers, who make up the majority of the farmer population, to leave the land. This foreshadows a continued confrontation between the government and the farmers even after the ratification of the Uruguay Round agreement in the National Assembly.

Together with the worsening of the relationship between farmers and the government, the labor-government relationship also began to sour badly in 1994. It cannot be denied that the government's call for the improvement of national competitiveness in order to survive in the era of a full-fledged liberalization has succeed to a degree in persuading the working class masses. However, this did not mean that workers were ready to accept the government intention of consolidating the national competitiveness on the basis of the sacrifice of the working class.

The difference in perception between the government and the working class was demonstrated in the differing inflation figures. While the government reported that (urban consumer) inflation in 1993 was 5.8%, the Jeunnohyup reported that actual inflation felt by worker household in 1993 was 17.7%. Furthermore, the government efforts to freeze wages despite an 8% increase in GNP in 1993 (signalling a turn around in the economic slow down) has also fanned the workers' distrust in the government. The settlement between the Federation of Korea Trade Unions and the National Federation of Industrial Organization to limit wage increase for second consecutive year has amplified workers' antagonism towards the FKTU. This led to a growing distrust in FKTU adding fuel to trade union campaign to sever affiliation with the FICTU. This has brought about a serious undermining of its organizational base.

The democratic trade union movement was given a great impetus by the withdrawal campaign by the unions affiliated to the FKTU. Boosted by the withdrawal campaign, the 1994 wage increase-collective bargaining agreement campaign of workers was stared in a more organized fashion with coordination of the timing of industrial actions and cultivation of a systematic solidarity struggles. Government, abandoning the soft-line policy of 1993, responded with hardline crackdown to the workers' industrial action.

The heavy-handed crackdown was first launched against industrial action of railway workers. Railway workers staged a sit-in action demanding the railway management to adhere to the conditions set in the Basic Labor Law. The government declared the railway workers action illegal by arguing that the group which had initiated the industrial action was an illegal body. Government sent in police to disband the workers' sit-in action. In undertaking a crackdown on the industrial actions government mobilized the repressive clauses in the labor related laws which had been denounced as representative evil laws of the past regimes and had been subjected to ongoing discussions for amendment.

Despite the concerted efforts, however, the government's wage freeze policy and the hardline crackdown seem to have failed to achieve their objective. By July 27, wage increase agreement has been concluded in some 4,162 workplaces (75.9%) out of the total 5,483 workplaces with more than 100 employees. The average rate of wage increase specified in the agreement was 7.0%. However, when the increases in various allowances and non-wage bonuses (which are not reflected in the formal wage settlement) are included, the real wage increase is expected to be higher than that of 12.2% recorded in the previous year. This represents a turn about in the 5 year trend of repeated falls in the rate of wage increase since 1989.

As can be seen in the strike by the workers of the Hanjin Heavy Industry and the Kumho Tyre and the signs of renewed industrial action by the workers of the Seoul Subway, the hardline policy of the government in dealing with industrial disputes has shown to have failed in clamping down on the workers struggles. Because of this the government has been forced to restrain from mobilizing law and order agencies against the industrial action by the workers of the Hyundai Heavy Industry (as of July 28) despite the management's decision to lock out the workers and its repeated denunciation that it is an illegal strike. The repressive action of the government and hardline position of the managements in response to the industrial actions of the workers in 1994 have brought about an intensification of the contradiction in the relationship between the state-capital and the labor

IV. The Limit of the Reform and the Direction of the Labor Movement

The reform undertaken by the Kim Young Sam regime cannot be regarded as an 'integrative' progressive reform aimed at coopting the labor by instigating the capital to yield to the labor. Rather it is an 'exclusionary' conservative reform aimed at re-organizing the system of control on workers and people through rationalization and increase in efficiency of domination. As a result, Kim's reform veered away from touching on the representative anti-democratic legal system such as the National Security Law which had been the buttress of the previous military dictatorial system. Furthermore, the Kim regime's reform has adhered to the "two nations" strategy of the previous Roh Tae Woo regime aimed at integrating and coopting the middle classes and the intellectuals while denying the possibility of redistribution of wealth, welfare, and power to the grassroots people.

The broadening of the space of activity for the middle classes and intellectuals at an increased rate under the Kim regime indicates that the regime is pursuing the "two nations" strategy in a more intensified manner. Furthermore, in the second phase of its governance, when the reform drive has in fact come to a conclusion, the Kim Young Sam regime has blatantly revealed itself to be the "political executive committee" of the monopoly chaebol which is enshrined as the primary vehicle of the "national competitiveness"

This reflects the changed character of the relationship between the Kim Young Sam's power base (which is the new comer in the ruling bloc) and the power base of the previous Fifth and Sixth republics (which are the ancient regime of the ruling bloc). The current cooperative system between new and old forces within the ruling bloc is one where system of cooperation is built on the basis of the dominance of the new forces. Thus it differs from that instituted by the mereer of the three political parties under the Roh Tae Woo regime. During the Roh regime the old forces had maintained a preeminent position.

The labor policy of the Kim Young Sam regime was "people-exclusionary" from the very beginning. The labor policy of the first phase can be characterized as a "hegemonic exclusionary strategy based on legalistic-economistic control" aimed at winning voluntary support of the workers through ideological offensive coupled with the principle of autonomy for labor-management relations.

The labor policy of the second phase which has reinstated repression as a primary response to industrial actions can be characterized as an "oppressive exclusionary strategy based on legalistic-economistic control" that was first adopted by the Roh Tae Woo regime following the "security state". However, the oppressive exclusionary strategy of the Kim Young Sam regime is currently seen as more retrogressive than that of the Roh Tae Woo regime which had attempted to combine a measure of reformistic incentives.

There are various reasons for the obvious limits in the political reforms undertaken by the Kim Young Sam regime to bring about improvement in democracy and its rapid retreat into oppressive exclusionary strategy from its initial hegemonic exclusionary strategy in labor policy.

First reason is related to the political character of Kim Young Sam's political power base. Unlike Kim Dae Jung who had represented relatively progressive segment of the liberal bourgeoisie, Kim Young Sam represents, as he had during his days in the opposition, the conservative faction of the liberal bourgeoisie. This itself acts as a limit on Kim Young Sam regime in undertaking a fundamental reform.

Second reason concerns the genealogy of Kim Young Sam regime. Kim regime was not built on a coalition of pan-democratic forces which opposed the military regime. Rather it emerged out of the compromise between the forces represented by Kim Young Sam and the reactionary bourgeois forces which dominated the Fifth and Sixth Republic. That is, the Kim Young Sam regime was born on the basis of the support of the forces that had ruled in the previous regimes. Therefore, it would be impossible for Kim Young Sam regime to undertake and continue a full-fledged reform unless it was determined to sever its ties with the forces that represent the past regimes which make up the majority in the present ruling bloc. The Kim Young Sam regime opted for a compromise rather than a confrontation with the forces of the Fifth and Sixth Republic. This became the critical factor in the early termination of the reform drive.

The third reason for the short lived reform drive stems from the changes in the power balance in the society The power balance between the conservative forces of the ancient regime and the people were tipped to the advantage of the conservative forces with the mercer of the three political parties and the birth of the Kim Young Sam regime. The political power of the people forces which had experienced continued growth under the repression of the military regime underwent weakening due to various subjective and objective conditions under the Roh Tae Woo regime. Its power was critically reduced with the inauguration of the Kim Young Sam regime.

The conservative forces were able to reverse the power balance with the birth of the Roh Tae Woo regime and the merger of three political parties. And it was able to consolidate its power base through the birth of the Kim Young Sam regime. In fact, the reform measures of the Kim Young Sam regime were -- for the conservative forces -- nothing more than 'a storm in a cup'.

The conservative forces, united under the banner of Cold War anti-communist ideology, have spearheaded the confrontation with north Korea and sustained the military dictatorial system. They have refused to recognize or yield -- even minutely -- to the progressive people's forces. They have in the past been the greatest obstacle to democratization and continues to blockade any real democratic reforms.

The vaporization of the reform was only a natural consequence of the weakening of the political power of the people's forces which had been the driving force of democrization and the change in the power balance to the advantage of the (ultra-rightist) conservative forces that make up the majority in the ruling bloc. The inauguration of the Kim Young Sam regime can be said to have contributed to a degree in advancing the reform of the society. However, in that it had brought about the weakening of the people's forces and the consolidation of the conservative forces of the ancient regime, in a long term perspective, it had a greater negative influence on the democratic reform of the Korean society.

The fourth reason can be found in economic factors. Since the mid-1980s, Korean economy entered a period of structural depression due to excessive overlapping investment in heavy chemical industries and the structural depression of the world economy. The economic boom in the mid-1980s based on "three lows" and the upturn in 1993 were temporary 'cyclical boom' within the long term structural depression. In such a context, undertaking appropriate measures to break out of the depression became paramount element of the economic policy of the bourgeois-dominated Korean state which possess powerful state instruments for capital accumulation. Furthermore, such a task became even more urgent in view of the resolution of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the heightening competition in the world market. The structural conditions that surround the Korean economy made it impossible for the state to pursue integrative policy.

These conditions set the socio-economic scene for the adoption of the exclusionary policies. In the second phase of its reign, Kim Young Sam regime has emphasized the importance of the unity of national purpose in order to strengthen national competitiveness. Government efforts set the scene for the strengthening of the political influence of the monopoly capital and the conservative forces of the ancient regime. These trends strengthened the government perception of the industrial action of workers as the main cause of the weakness in national competition. Such a perspective has been a key factor in the hardening of the government's labor policy.

Fifth reason reflects the reality and the perception of the democratic movement by the conservative forces and the Kim Youn Sam regime. The growth of the democratic trade union movement which attempts to maintain independence from the state and capital is seen as a potential threat to the political structure dominated by conservative forces. It is also seen as a real threat which could jeopardize the state economic policy for economic revitalization and strengthening of national competitiveness. Thus the fact that the current workers' struggles are led by the forces of democratic trade union movement is another cause for the repressive turn in the government's labor policy.

The democratic labor movement, faced with the reform drive of the Kim Young Sam regime, had at first suffered some confusion in its direction and attitude. However, through the formation of the National Conference of Trade Union Representatives (Jeunnodae) it expanded and strengthened the breadth and quality of nation-wide solidarity. In response to the spread of the campaign by the FKTU affiliated unions to sever their ties with the official national center has given a new and greater impetus to its objective of building a new (second) democratic national trade union center. As a part of its endeavor, the democratic trade union movement has put forward a plan for the formation and launching of the second national trade union center. The plan calls for a concerted campaign for the revision of labor related laws in the second half of 1994, launching of democratic national labor center preparatory committee during the annual November workers national rally and the formal launching of the center in Spring of 1995.

However, the efforts to form and launch the democratic national labor center may not be an easy and smooth task in view of the oppressive labor policies of the Kim Young Sam regime. The Kim Young Sam regime shows no sign wanting to repeal the prohibition of trade union participation in political activities, the prohibiton of third party intervention, involuntary government mediation in industrial disputes and other repressive anti-labor clauses of the labor related laws. ILO has on several occasions identified these clauses as anti-labor clauses and adopted resolutions calling on the Korean government to revise them. Korean government realizes the difficulties caused by maintaining these clauses, especially in view of the Blue Round negotiations which link basic labor laws to trade issues.

The government procrastination in revising these clauses and continued utilization betrays its effort to remove militant trade union activists before the eventual formation of the second national labor center. The efforts of the government can also be interpreted as giving aid to the forces which are cooperative in their relation with the state and the capital in taking control of the second national labor center that would be formed in future. However, such a prospect is regarded as unlikely in view of the strength of the disappointment of workers in the Kim Young Sam regime and the perception that it is an anti-labor government.

The government repression has in effect made trade unionists realize the urgency of building a new national labor center. Furthermore, the trade union activists who have waged unrelenting struggle despite harsh government repression have gained greater trust and support of the rank and file members enabling them to emerge as genuine leaders of the nascent new national labor center. With the prospect of the launching of a new national labor center, the democratic trade union movement in Korea is on the threshold of a new stage of its development since the formation and launching of the Jeunnohyup. When the democratic trade union movement finally succeeds in forming the second national labor center, it will have the effect of amplifying the social influence of the labor movement and an acceleration in the transfer of the leadership of the people's movement to the working class.

However, the democratic trade union movement faces great number of hurdles in the course of its development. First is the question of the structure of unions in the second national labor center. The current trade unions are enterprise (company) level unions where individual unions are established in each workplace. Whether the second national labor center can depart from the present union structure towards establishing a system of industry level unions is a central issue is determining the class unity and national solidarity in struggle.

Currently two plans for the structure of unions for the second national labor center is tabled in the Jeunnohyup. One is a plan to build the second national labor center as a system of 'enterprise level federations'. The other is 'industrial federation system.' The level of unity and capacity for struggle embodied in the second national labor center will be greatly influenced by the choice on the structure of union system. If, in view of the fact that the present democratic trade union movement is led by metal workers, an industrial federation system is adopted, the second national labor center is likely to be led by metal industry federation which encompasses the most militant segment of the working class.

Second hurdle is the issue of relation with the existing national labor center in the form of Federation of Korea Trade Unions. Currently Federation of Korea Trade Unions is in its greatest crisis since its formation due to the strength of the boycott of affiliation dues and the withdrawal campaign by the affiliated unions. The second national labor center faces the task of embracing the 'middle' unions. Middle unions are those which either have severed ties with the FKTU but has not yet joined the Jeunnodae or maintain only a formal affiliation with the FKTU.

The second national labor center faces the task of incorporating these unions while maintaining a militant position. Only by successfully achieving this double-edged task can the second national labor center become a genuine national organization of the Korean working class. A failure to resolve this issue may give opportunity to the state and capital, which are intent on driving a wedge between the working masses and the democratic movement, to cultivate a third national labor center composed of those 'middle' unions. Such a development will be detrimental to the national unity and solidarity of the working class.

Korean capital is undertaking a systematic effort to introduce a new management strategy based on the Japanese strategy under the active support of the government. In line with this trend, there has emerged a force in the trade union movement which embrace an economistic trade unionism content to maintain the current enterprise level union system. This kind of unionism is intent only on achieving economic benefits.

Such a trend is led by the Hyundai Motors Trade Union which once was a central force of the militant trade union movement. However, such an effort has found difficulty in establishing a strong ground due to the wage freeze policy of the government. The economic benefits obtained by this kind of unions are in fact parasitic by-product of the achievements of the militant trade union movement. Such a parasitic character is one of the critical obstacles to its development. Mounting effective countermeasures to the new form of subordinate economistic trade unionism is another task faced by the democratic trade union movement.

Third hurdle concerns the level of organized workers. The level of organized workers continued to fall since its peak of 18.7% in 1989. In 1993, it has dropped to 14%. The decrease in the trade union organization reflects not only the repression of the government but also the difficulties suffered by trade unions in small to medium businesses where company closure and job insecurity have become prevalent due to the continued depression and globalization and liberalization. The fall in ratio of organized workers have been an important factor in disrupting the class solidarity of workers and in the decrease in the social influence of the trade union movement.

Efforts to increase the ratio of organized workers and efforts to redress the severe imbalance between the conditions of workers employed in large companies and those of small to medium companies have emerged as two of the most important tasks of the democratic trade union movement. The efforts to overcome the present form of enterprise level trade union system is one of the most important steps for the organization of the currently non-organized workers.

Forth hurdle concerns the issue of political formation of the working class. Building the working class into a political force is, for the democratic trade union movement, as an urgent task as building a new national labor movement center based on industrial trade union system.

Two differing views on this issue co-exist within the democratic trade union movement. One position calls for independent political force (formation) of the working class. Such a political force is seen as capable of presenting a clear class position. The other position calls for solidarity with radical democratic bourgeois forces and other democratic forces to expand and deepen democratic reform. The former position is represented by the groups calling for the formation of progressive workers/labor party or people's party oriented to a fundamental transformation. The latter position adheres to 'democratic coalition strategy' that has dominated the people's movement in the recent past. The political program of the second national labor center will have significant implications for the future of the militant-independent trade union movement and the political landscape of Korean society

V. Conclusion

As with the world capitalism, there is little prospect, in the short term, for Korean capitalism to break out of the current structural depression. Furthermore, it is very likely that the political power balance in the Korean society will for the foreseeable future be dominated by the conservative forces. Thus the labor policy of the state will, unless the political power of the people and the working class undergo a rapid growth, continue to reflect an exclusionary strategy. However, such an exclusionary policy of the government has in fact been an impetus for the growth of the democratic trade union movement.

When the second national labor center is finally formed and launched, the democratic trade union movement will soon become the most powerful social force that will be able to replace the middle-class dominated civil society movement as the leading force of the social movement in Korea. However, to what degree the democratic trade union movement is able to build an independent political formation, and on its basis build a powerful political movement, is yet inconclusive. The development of labor movement into a political movement is determined by various subjective and objective factors. There are some factors which have positive influence on such a development and some negative influence.

If the consolidation of the unity of working class by organizing workers into a trade union movement independent of the state and the capital is the first gate in the course of 'class formation'. The organization of a political movement independent of the state and capital on the basis of an organic unity between political labor movement and trade union movement is the second gate.

The workers in Korea are currently on the threshold of the first gate. It is generally recognized that it is impossible for a labor movement to develop a trade union movement independent of the state and capital without successfully passing through the second gate. However, the passage through the second gate is a far more difficult task than the passage through the first gate in the unique political-ideological landscape of Korean society.

The question whether the labor movement in Korea is able to pass through the second gate successfully riding on the momentum of the passage through the first gate has critical implication also for the prospect of the development of the democratic reforms in Korea.

 



KILSP:labor95@interpia.net