이름: 연구기획실 on February 09, 1998 at 18:36:37:
The 'Late Blooming' of
South Korean Labor Movements
by Hochul Sonn
Associate Professor of the Dept. of
Political Science,
Sogang University
Deputy-Director
of KILSP
South Korea is mostly known as an economic success story in
which it, once a hopeless 'aid-junkie', has emerged as one of the most
successful NICs. However, few pays attention to the fact that this success was
possible mainly because of ruthless superexploitation of the Korean working
class exemplified by, to name a few, its longest working hour and highest
industrial accident ratio in the world. This superexploitation, in turn, was
possible because of the weak labor' and the absence of the class politics in
Korea. However, this started to change recently. The South Korean labor
movements have grown rapidly and finally materalized a founding of The Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions(KCTU), the long-waiting national federation of
independent and progressive but illegal trade unions, in 1995 against the
vicious repression. As reported globally, the clash of this growth and the
'neo-liberal' policy of the government resulted in the first general strike in
Korean history, which produced a de facto knock-down of the government.
In brief, in terms of progressive movements in general and
labor movements in particular, one can say about 'Korean exceptionalism'. South
Korea is exceptional in the dual sense: 'early absence' and 'late blooming'of
the movements.
Background
Even with the standard of the Third World, South Korean labor
movements had been exceptionally weak. Labor movements had been identified as
communism, and the word class had been prohibited even in the academic world
until recently. This is due to several factors such as 1) the unprecedently
narrow ideological terrain resulting from the Korean War and the consequent
division of the nation, 2) the state's repression, particularly 'state
corporatist' control of the trade unions, 3) decentralization of the working
class due to the small factory dominant industrial structure, 4) high social
mobility owing to the nation-wide educational fever.
However, this started to change since the early 1980s. The
Kwangju massacre in 1980, in which the military massacred more than 200
civilians in its multi-stage coup after the assasination of President Park,
triggered the rebirth of the radical movements in South Korea for the first time
since the Korean War in the early 1950s. The result was a sudden 'explosion of
Marxism' and radical movements, particularly among student movements. This
movements slowly penetrated the newly emerging working class due to the heavy
industrialization in the 1970s, that is, the highly concentrated one with
strategic power which could paralze the whole economy but suffered from
'premodern' labor relations and conditions. In short, when Marxism suffered from
the unprecedented crisis, particularly after the fall of the Soviet Bloc, in
most of the world, it as well as labor movements experienced an unprecedented
'explosion' and 'blooming' in South Korea.
In particular, 'democratization', achieved by the June
People's Struggle in 1987 which ruined the military government's plan to
continue its rule, accelerated this tendency. The weakening of the repressive
state apparatus kindled the historical Great July and August Workers' Struggle,
in which the Korean working class broke its long silence and rushed to the
street all over the country. This struggle was defeated because of the hostile
attitute of the middle class whose main concerns were 'order' and 'economy'.
However, the struggle resulted into an emergence of new leadership equipped with
non-coopted 'militant unionsim' and progressive world-view. The failure of the
coup d'etat and the consequent breakdown of Soviet Union finally poured cold
water to infant flame of radical movements in South Korea. Many leaders,
particularly intellectuals, left the movements with open denunciations. And yet
labor movements were different. It was not the existence of Soviet Union and
dogmatic Marx-Leninism but the cold reality of Korean capitalism that bore the
new labor movements. In spite of brutal repressions by monopoly capitals and
the so-called 'democratic' and 'civilian' government, this new labor movements
launched a number of heroic struggles and expanded their influence in key
industries. In 1995, with the platforms to build not only democratic labor
movements but also "a truly democratic society", they finally founded the
historical KCTU against the Federation of Korean Trade Unions(FKTU), which was
established with the support of the American Military Government in Korea after
the liberation from Japanese colonialism to fight against grass-rooted leftist
trade unions and has been controlled by the government and sided with the
ditatorship throughout its history. In terms of the membership, the former has
about a half million members from almost a thousand trade unions whereas the
latter has 1.2 million members. The KCTU, however, has the total control over
the three vital industries in Korea, i.e., automobile, shipbuilding, and heavy
industry as well as key white collar workers such as in hospitals, mass-medias,
and research institutes.
What Caused The Historic General
Strike?
It is essential to have a basic knowledge on South Korean labor
relations in order to understand the recent general strike in Korea. Korean
labor acts had many premodern, anti-democratic clauses which restricts basic
rights of the workers. Typical examples were so-called 'four prohibitions': 1)
prohibition of 'three party intervention' in labor disputes; 2) prohibition of
multiple trade unions which provides the monopolic power to the
government-controlled undemocratic FKTU; 3) prohibition of the right to organize
by Civil Servives and teachers; 4) prohibition of political activities by trade
unions.
The Korean working class led by the KCTU has launched
numerous struggles to democratize this inhumane practice. The government
suppressed these struggles by utilizing not also the anti-democratic labor acts
but also other laws such as the notorious national security act. This is
illustrated by the fact that the largest portion of the political prisoners
under the current regime is the workers. However, the economic and social costs
of these labor disputes has increased drastically as to reach the point of
tolerance. In fact, in order to solve this problem, the present civilian
government tried the labor reform as a part of the ambitious total reform
project in its early period, that is, in 1993. And yet capital, particularly the
zaibol, the family-owned conglomerate in Korea, responded as strikes,
that is, refusal to invest. As a consequence, the economy became bad and the
government gave up the reform to go back to old labor practices.
Another social force that caused the general strike was
capital itself. As known well, up to the mid 1980s, South Korea has enjoyed one
of the most successful and rapid economic growth through export-oriented
industrialization on the basis of cheap and highly disciplined labor. However,
since the late 1980s, things started to change. Its 'international
competitiveness' began to decline both because of rapid raise of wages resulting
from the growth of labor movements and because of the emergence of the second
generation NICs in Southeastern Asia and China as competitors. In addition to
this, its two motors of economic growth, state-initiated industrialization and
zaibol structure began to lose their magics. Excessive state intervention
and regulation became dysfunctional. The economy based on the the
competitiveness of the overgrown zaibol groups rather then that of individual
company produced more and more inefficiency. Finally, acceleration of
globalization of capital exemplified by the Uruguy Round Particularly, the
Uruguay Round threw a new crisis to the Korean economy heavily dependent on
export. To solve this structural crisis of Korean capitalism, the Korean
capitalists introduced the new management strategy which enabled flexible
accumulation., a kind of dependent post-fordist accumulation regime, and the
state introduced Sekehwa(the total globalization policy), a Korean
version of global neo-liberalism, while caliming its principal task as the
enhancement of international competitiveness. So the government became a
'civilian developmental dictatorship', to put it more precisely, 'international
competitiveness dictatorship' armed with the slogan of 'international
competitiveness first, democracy and distribution later'. However, these
attempts met severe resistance from the working class. Therefore, the capital
needed to change the labor law in such a direction to facilitate this flexible
accumulation strategy. Finally, the decision to join OECD in order to
materialize its globalization policy forced the government to 'modernize'
out-dated law acts such as to meet the minimum international norm.
Cross-fired by these pressures, in Summer 1996, the state
decided to amend labor acts in the contradictory direction. To meet the labor's
demands, it attempted to reform the collective labor relations such as
elimination of 'four prohibitions' except the right to organize by Civil
Services and teachers. At the same time, it decided to permit the capital to
worsen individual labor relations by loosening the conditions of lay-off,
allowing the employment of irregular workers, etc. Besides, the state hoped to
introduce Western type 'democratic social corporatism' in labor relations by
making the new labor law through the concensus of labor and capital. And yet the
KCTU replied that it could not accept the new individual labor relations whereas
the capital rejected the new collective relations. Therefore the new labor act
became a total class war between the capitalists and the working class in Korea.
What Happened in the General
Strike?
Failing to attaining the consent from both labor and capital,
the state decided to amend the law without their consents. As the time went on,
the economic crisis had worsened. The economic growth slowed down, and many
companies, particularly mediem and small firms, went bankcrupt in a masive
scale. Besides, exports slowed down and trade deficit increased dramatically. In
brief, the Korean miracle seemed to disappear.
At this conjuncture, the Kim Young-Sam government made two
key, but wrong, strategic decisions. The bad economic situation and the cry-out
of the zaibols strengthened the voice of the neo-liberal
'economy-firsters' in relation to the reformists in the ruling bloc. The result
was the decision to postpone the reform of the key prohibitions whereas
satisfying the demands of capital. In brief, the new act was the deterioration
of the already undemocratic labor relations and the brutal total offense of the
capital against the Korean working class with the help of the state. The second
decision was no less important. The government decided to pass the law before
the end of 1996 by any means for the fear that otherwise it may not be able to
amend the law in the near future beacuse of the upcoming presidential election
and annual spring labor disputes related to annual wage negotiations.
Furthermore, in order to utilize the agency for the coming presidential
election, Kim Young-Sam decided to, as a package with the new labor act, pass
the National Security Planning Agency(a new name for KCIA) Act which will give
this notorious secrect agency for violation of human rights new powers he
deprieved in his early year as a political reform.
For the fear of labor's resistance, the government made the
content of the final draft of the new law secret even to its own National
Assemblymen. Furthermore, the opposition parties, who had shown few oppositions
to the government's draft because of their conservative political colors and the
fear of power of the zaibols related to the coming election, changed its
attitude toward the passing of the law before 1997 as a token gesture for the
working class and as a fight for political initiatives. This change forced the
government to pass these two undemocratic acts through the 'snatching session'
in early morning of December 26 orchestrated by secret military-like operations
even without noticing to the opposition parties and reporters.
This arrogant action of the government applied a spark to a
powder keg ready to explode. The result is history. The KCTU, which had
threatened the general strike repeatedly, launched the general strike. Many
people worried about the result, but the response was successful. Even the FKTU
joined the strike and launched its own general strike. And other citizens,
particularly conservative middle class, which had shown hostile attitude to
strikes, were supportive to the strike
It was not simply a general strike but also a political general
strike. Even the middle class joined.
The President made an announcement to admit the mistake and
promises to reamend the labor act and thereby de facto surrender in front of the
working class.
After the
Strike
There still remains live sparks and the KTCU promises another
general strike in the summer, and yet the battle is almost over. Therefore it is
time to calculate the, if not final, tentative balance sheet. As promised, the
government reamended the labor act through the negotiation with the opposition
parties. The final product resembles the government's original draft. It
abolishes the four prohibitions except the right to organize by Civil Services
and servants, and thereby the KTCU became not only the de facto but also
de jure representative of the Korean working class. However, most of the
demand of capital were realized with minor restrictions.
The KTCU promised the fourth general strike if the National
Assembly pass the draft agreed by the political parties. However, new political
conjuncture moulded by unexpected events such as the bankruptcy of a major
zaibol and the related financial scandal of astronomical amount and the
political refugee of a top-ranking North Korean official compelled the KTCU
withdraw the promise. Instead, it decided to fight for the reamendment of labor
act in the annual wage negotiations in Summer. However, it seems to have lost
its momentum and golden oppotunity. The decision to postpone the strike in
January after the president's promise to reamend the act was a vital tactical
mistake. The KTCU should have pushed a little further because it was definitely
a win-win situation. If so, the conequence must have been either the total
surrender of the government and capital or a 'spendid heroic ending' by the
brutal force, which would resulted in a far stronger rebuilding of the movements
in the near future, probably at the coming presidential election as the form of
working class candidate. Unfortunately, the leadership of the KTCU gave the
final finish blow.
However, this shortage does not change the historical meaning
of this strike. For the first time in the Korean history, the Korean working
class succeeded in defeating the total offense of capital and the state. This
victory is of more significance when taking into consideration that this victory
was achieved in the country whose labor has been exceptionally weak and who is,
due to its outward-looking economic structure, highly vulnerable to
globalization, that is, new offense of capital, particularly capital in the
center, to solve its structural crisis such as overaccumulation. The strike
shortened the 'full blooming' of labor movements and the forming of the working
class party in South Korea at least ten years by making the working class
disillusioned by the bougeoisie politics and recognize an urgent need to
organize itself politically. Furthermore, by demonstrating its national
leadership over other popular forces in democartic struggles, for the first
time, the Korean working class went bwyond 'economic-corporate' and became
'national-popular'. A recent national survey shows, more than 40 percents of the
respondents ansered that they would vote for President of KCTU in the
presidental election in this December.
Many dangers are waiting for us and we must be aware of too
much optimism. There is a danger of KCTU becoming another CIO by being trapped
industrial corporatism. Subsumpted by the capital, the Korean working class has
a danger of individualization and being a prisoner of company unionim. Pressures
from globalization and the bad economy might make the workers subscribe to the
propaganda of 'economic revitalization first logic' or 'saving the company
logic'. Furthermore, Korean workers has to overcome 'red complex' and North
Korean variable. It also must overcome the regionalism, the dominant political
cleaverage in Korea after democratization, in order to organize themselves
politically. Even though it succeed in organizing politically, the danger of
social democracy are waiting for it. The Korean working class, as a
late-starter, has three difficult tasks, democratizing the working place,
creating the united working class in 'civil society', and organzing itself
politically in the age of unprecedentedly unlimited global competition. Even
though a late-starter, the Korean working class is making painful but steady
steps for humane society free from oppression of capital.